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JUNE 1982

JUNIOR NCO LEADERSHIP

bу

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD R. SKLAR, II
INFANTRY



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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM		
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER		
	AD-A119695	T		
4. TITLE (and Subtifie)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED		
Junior NCO Leadersh	ip	Study Project		
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER		
7. AUTHOR(e)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)		
Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. S	klar, II			
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT PROJECT TASK		
US Army War College		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS		
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17031		`		
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,				
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE		
		1 June 1982		
Same		52		
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different	t from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of thin report)		
		Unclassified		
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)				
Approved for public release; dis	stribution unlimi	ted.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abatract entered	in Black 20. If different for	m Report)		
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

JUNIOR NCO LEADERSHIP

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

bу

Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Sklar, II Infantry

US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 1 June 1982

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AUTHOR(S): Richard R. Sklar, II, LTC, IN

TITLE: Junior NCO Leadership

FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 1 June 1982 PAGES: 52

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Unclassified

CLASSIFICATION:

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CHAPTER I

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This study has been conducted at the request of LTG Thurman, DCSPER, HQ DA, in response to a query from MC Merritt, Commandant, USAWC, concerning identification of key issues for study by AWC students.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of the study is to determine what can be done to solve the junior non-commissioned officer leadership problem that exists Army-wide.

(LTG Thurman pointed out in his letter that 85% of commanders Army-wide, on the most recent DA opinion survey, identified junior NCO leadership as their most serious problem.)

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

Phase I (Initial Coordination)

To gain more understanding of the problem, coordination was conducted with the HQDA DCSPER point of contact, Colonel Bob Carroll, Chief, Leadership Division, HRD. Colonel Carroll and his people provided extensive information concerning NCO leadership issues and current leadership philosophy held by the Army's leaders. Discussions were also held with Dr. Joyce Shields, Dr. Owen Jacobs, and Dr. Mel Kimmel of the Army Research Institute of the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) in Alexandria, Virginia. Dr. Kimmel subsequently became the ARI point of contact for the study.

To gain additional perspective, numerous informal interviews were conducted with AWC classmates who had recently commanded battalions. A visit was also conducted to HQ TRADOC to discuss key education and training issues with Colonel Carl Nock (DCST, NCOES) and LTG Becton (DCG, TRADOC).

Phase II (Development of Study Methodology)

The study methodology required soldiers (subordinates), NCO's at squad level (peer/self) and platoon sergeants (superiors) to rate, through the use of survey instruments, the technical competence and leadership skills of junior NCO's in their squads and platoons. Based on an overall rating, the competency of each NCO in the study would be computed and then compared to unit performance results, such as SQT scores, PT scores, rifle marksmanship scores, squad and platoon ARTEP results, reenlistments and the results of Annual General Inspections. The hypothesis was that junior NCO's possessing high technical competence and high leadership skill would be part of squads and platoons that achieved higher degrees of success than units of the same size having NCO's with low technical competence and low leadership skill. Unit performance data was collected from 1st Sergeants. Only those individuals assigned to mechanized infantry squa were examined in order to facilitate comparisons of identical skills between units.

At the beginning of this phase, a concept briefing on study methodology and content was provided to LTG Thurman for decision (Appendix 5). Approval was granted with only one change: LTG Thurman directed that the survey instrument be administered in Europe rather than CONUS since, in his opinion, lower NCO strength fill in CONUS would confound the data.

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Once approval was granted, survey instruments were written. These were staffed again with AWC classmates who recently commanded battalions for

validity, and with Dr. Kimmel and others at ARI to insure that some of the more important behavioral science oriented issues were addressed.

Phase III (Validation of Survey Process)

The completed survey instruments were administered to a mechanized infantry company assigned to the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart. Georgia. Coordination was made with MG Graham, Chief of Staff, FORSCOM, and MG Galvin, CG, 24th Infantry Division. Dr. Kimmel accompanied me on the trip to assist in the administration of the survey and to insure that no survey administration principles were violated. The validation phase was successful. Interviews with soldiers and NCO's assigned to the unit surveyed provided superb feedback. Through their suggestions, questions concerning physical fitness and training environment were added to the survey. The revised surveys were finalized and approved by MILPERCEN for administration. Control numbers were also assigned by MILPERCEN.

Phase IV (Data Collection)

Initial coordination for the trip to Germany was made with USAREUR Headquarters and the 8th Infantry Division, the unit selected to provide soldiers for the administration of the survey. Requirements for unit performance data were mailed early-on to the 8th Infantry Division point of contact, Major Bob Frank, Deputy G-3. Thirteen mechanized infantry rifle companies were identified in the division to survey. The following procedures were followed at each company:

1. The day prior to the survey a coordination meeting was held with the unit 1SG. At the meeting, unit performance data was verified, times and locations for the administration of the survey were coordinated, and informal interviews were conducted.

- 2. The next day the unit was surveyed in two groups: all infantry soldiers E4 and below working in infantry squads in one group; all NCO's working in infantry squads and the rifle platoon sergeants in the other group. The soldiers were required to rate the NCO's in their squads; the NCO's were required to rate themselves and all other NCO's working at squad level in their platoons.
- 3. Informal interviews were then conducted with randomly selected soldiers and NCO's with regard to their perceptions of how to make the junior NCO Corps more effective.

Three employees of the ARI Field Office in Germany assisted during this phase by coding survey results onto sheets used later by keypunch operators to reduce the data to punch cards.

Phase V (Data Analysis)

The first step during this phase was to create punch cards for the survey results and unit performance results. The cards were then sent to ARI. Ms. Sugan Kerner-Hoeg, a data analyst who works for Dr. Jacobs, then analyzed the data according to the research plan which was developed by Dr. Kimmel, Ms. Kerner-Hoeg and myself. Several major problems were encountered during this phase. The largest was that of time. Only 20% of the data was received from ARI by 10 May. Another 50% was received 26 May and, as a result, significant portions of the analysis are not contained in this study report.

The other major problem revolved around the inability to get any accurate, comparable, and measurable unit performance data that was to be correlated to perceptions of NCO competence. The Army does not measure the effectiveness of infantry squads and platoons in a consistent manner.

Squad ARTEP's are administered at company or battalion level and tasks, conditions, and standards vary markedly between units. Some units have division level evaluated squad and platoon tactical exercises, but the infrequency with which they are conducted in light of the high degree of trubulence at squad level makes correlations of NCO competency and unit performance invalid.

Part VI (Follow-on Analysis)

This paper will be followed by three products which address the central issues in more detail. It is anticipated that a final briefing of study findings and recommendations will be presented to LTG Thurman in July or August 1982. A copy of the briefing will be forwarded to AWC to be appended to this paper. Secondly, Dr. Kimmel, at ARI, will use the data to write a Technical Report under the ARI letterhead. A number will be assigned to the report at publication. Finally, additional written analysis, either in the form of an article for publication or merely a listing of additional findings and recommendations, will be forwarded to AWC for inclusion in this study.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER

The remainder of this paper will first demographically describe today's junior infantry NCO and will then present some findings and recommendations concerning the environment in which the NCO works. Finally, strengths and weaknesses of junior NCO's as perceived by themselves, their subordinates, and their superiors will be analyzed. This will include a listing of some recommendations to dissolve the weaknesses. Throughout the paper, findings and recommendations will include comments received through informal interviews with soldiers and NCO's at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and those assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Germany.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

- 1. See Appendix 1: Ltr from LTG Thurman to MG Merritt.
- 2. See Appendix 2: Final survey instruments.
- 3. See Appendix 3: Unit performance measures.

4. See Appendix 4: Research Plan: <u>Perceived Junior NCO Competancies</u> and Deficiencies.

CHAPTER II


DEMOGRAPHICS OF JUNIOR NCO'S OF INFANTRY

INTRODUCTION

The data generated by questionnaires administered to infantrymen, E1 through E6, who work in mechanized infantry squads, focuses on the corporals, sergeants, and staff sergeants who fill the positions of squad leader and team leader in those squads. There are 139 of these NCO's in the survey sample, which is statistically large enough to approximate all mechanized infantry NCO's assigned at squad level throughout the US Army. In this chapter, data will be presented which identifies some of the demographic characteristics of this group which make some of the later findings and recommendations more meaningful.

THE NCO SHORTAGE

Survey data reveals both a quantitative and a qualitative shortage of NCO's in mechanized infantry squads.



RANK

FIGURE II-1: NCO RANK STRUCTURE IN INFANTRY SQUADS

In Figure II-1 we see that while E6 strength in infantry squads is only 1% below TOE requirements, a 15% shortage of E5's exists. But this does not tell the whole story, since this just represents the ratio of E6's, E5's, and E4's in squads. Closer analysis revelas significant quantitative shortages of NCO's in rifle squads.




FIGURE 11-2: NUMBER OF NCO'S IN INFANTRY SQUADS


This figure dramatically points out that almost 90% of the mechanized infantry squads in the 8th Infantry Division are below TOE strength in NCO's. The unit readiness reports, however, would not indicate such a severe shortage. Division, brigad, battalion, and company headquarters overstrengths, and the fill of critical positions in anti-tank, mortar, and support platoons where serious shortages exist, have blesd away significant numbers of infantry NCO's. Armor units have been somewhat protected from this phenomenon due to a recognized requirement to stabilize tank crews. But the advent of the M2, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, makes the requirement to stabilize and fill infantry crews as important.

As an aside, even though 32% of all NCO's in the sample were E6, only 60% of the squad leader positions are filled by E6. The other 40% are

filled by E5's. Does the Army want a system as potent and complex as the Bradley commanded by an E5?

MONTHS AND YEARS

Not only are the NCO's in infantry squads below TOE requirements, but a significant number are young and inexperienced.



* Contains everyone counted in the "less than four years" block

FIGURE II-3: SQUAD LEVEL NCO--TIME IN SERVICE

Figure II-3 indicates that less than 20% of these NCO's have more than eight years' service. This places most of them with their second or third unit since leaving Fort Benning.




FIGURE II-4: SQUAD LEVEL NCO--TIME IN GRADE

Additionally, few of them have been NCO's very long. 68% of all squad level NCO's are E5 or CPL, and 41% of these have one year or less in grade; over 80% have less than two years in grade.

Maturity is also a problem, since only 10.8% of the NCO's at squad level are at least 30 years old. In fact, over 38% are 23 or younger. 1

WHERE AND WITH WHOM DOES HE LIVE?

A startling 78% of this group of young NCO's are, or have been,




FIGURE 11-5: SQUAD LEVEL NCO--MARITAL STATUS

But as we can see from Figure II-5, 40% of the NCO's are essentially free from family pressure in the immediate environment. The other 60%, however, have a wife and possibly children to focus on, in addition to their subordinates and the unit. Of those that are married and living with their wives, one-third have the added problem of living on the economy while the other two-thirds must contend with either a stairwell or high-rise existence.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Most of the NCO's surveyed had attended the appropriate military school and most felt the courses did an adequate job of preparing them to




FIGURE 11-6: SQUAD LEVEL NCO's -- HIGHEST MILITARY EDUCATION LEVEL ACHIEVED

This chart reflects that slightly over 90% of all junior NCO's have attended at least one level of training under NCOES. Interestingly, most of the NCO's feel that their training did a good job preparing them to be NCO's, as shown in the figure below.




FIGURE 11-7: NCO PREPARATORY TRAINING PERCEPTIONS

While only 7% said NCOES did not prepare them to be NCO, slightly over 11% did not attend an NCOES course prior to becoming an NCO.

The civilian education picture is not as positive, however.

Approximately 26% of all squad level NCO's joined the Army without having graduated from high school. (As will be pointed out in more detail later in the study, the NCO's are significantly better off in this area than are the E4's and below in the squads. Over 43% of this latter group failed to graduate prior to entering the Army.)²

REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS

By examining time-in-service statistics, one can readily deduce that at least 72% of the infantry squad NCO's have already reenlisted once.

That trend appears to be continuing. Over 60% indicate positive reenlistment intentions, while only 19% possess negative reenlistment intentions.

21% are undecided.

CONCLUSIONS

The most critical demographic problem associated with NCO's at squad level is their shortage. Overall, a 36% shortage exists. Only 13 of 117

squads surveyed have three NCO's and only 3 squads of 117 are TOE (1 E6, 2 E5). Readiness reports reflect a relatively high NCO fill in MOS 11B in grades E5 and E6. Therefore, shortages exist for the following reasons: overstrength headquarters at every level from platoon through theater; critical shortages in positions that must be filled in the anti-tank, mortar, and support platoons; requirements to beef-up maintenance and maintenance management assets.

The squad level infantry NCO's, although young and inexperienced, are responsible for training their subordinates on numerous weapons systems and soldiers manual tasks and for being able to operate mounted and dismounted under simulated combat conditions. And yet over 50% of their subordinates are 20 years old or younger, 43% did not graduate from high school prior to entering the Army, and only 34% have positive reenlistment intentions. To compound the problem, over 60% of the NCO's have families with them.

Despite these difficulties, over 90% were trained at one or more levels of NCOES and over 80% of these say that training adequately prepared them to be λ CO's.

Finally, the group is fairly positive, since about 60% indicate a desire to reenlist.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army must:

- 1. Reduce the shortage problem prior to fielding the Bradley. This might be done by requiring units to report where soldiers work, rather than where they are assigned by UMR.
- 2. Recognize the tremendous load carried by the young NCO who has a family by providing him good administrative and medical support.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Survey statistics: Self-appraisal, frequency distribution.
- 2. Survey statistics: Subordinate ratings; frequency distribution.

CHAPTER III

THE ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will present the results of survey data and informal interviews which focus on the environment in which the NCO works.

THE SUBORDINATES

The typical infantry squad member is 20-21 years old with less than two years in the Army. About one-third are E1/E2; one-third are E3; and one-third are E4. Over 81% of the young men have less than one year in grade. Therefore, they are young and inexperienced.




FIGURE III-1: E4 AND BELOW: CIVILIAN SCHOOL COMPLETED PRIOR TO JOINING THE ARMY

As can be seen from the above figure, over 40% did not complete high school prior to entering the Army. Additionally, slightly over 65% of the squad members do not possess positive reenlistment intentions. So the young mechanized infantry NCO has the problem of leading and training a significant number of young, inexperienced high school drepouts who have no intention of staying in the Army.

THE SUPERIORS

The squad level NCO's were required on the survey to answer two questions with regard to the help they receive from their superiors in the unit.





FIGURE III-2: SUPERIOR TREATMENT OF JUNIOR NCO's

This figure demonstrates that 57.6% of junior NCO's surveyed possess the perception that superiors in the unit listen to and take some sort of action on their recommendations half the time or less. They also perceive that less than 30% of the senior NCO's in the unit are "extremely concerned about them."



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FIGURE III-3: SENIOR NCO CONCERN FOR JUNIOR NCO

This figure also points to the fact that about one quarter of the junior NCO's feel that senior NCO's have no concern for them.

PROMOTION TRANSFER POLICY

One of the most universally mentioned complaints voiced by NCO's in informal interviews was that of not being transferred to another unit upon being promoted to NCO (CPL or SGT). In each instance, the NCO's complained of the difficulties associated with establishing and maintaining discipline over soldiers who for months were their peers. When left in the same squad, soldiers would invariably remind the new NCO of things he had done wrong as an E4 or below, or the mistakes he had made.




FIGURE III-4: DISPOSITION OF NCO WHEN PROMOTED

This figure shows that only 1.4% of newly promoted NCO's were transferred to another company, 12.2% to another platoon in the same company, and 17.3% to another squad in the same platoon. An amazingly high 63.3% were not transferred out of their squad. A floating grade structure was developed for armor MOS so that tank crew stability would not be broken by promotion. This would not be appropriate in infantry, since the SGT E5 in armor is not a leader/NCO like the SGT E5 is in infantry. The tank gunner has no subordinates; the infantry fire team leader does. Furthermore, sergeants promoted to warrant officer are transferred to another battalion as a matter of policy. Why can't we transfer new E5's to at least another platoon in the same company?


TRAINING

The junior NCO definitely feels that he is not given the support needed to train his subordinates. Interestingly, most senior officers and senior NCO's interviewed said that the most glaring deficiency possessed by junior NCO's was their inability to train subordinates. But 70% of the junior NCO's said they either could not obtain training aids or it was extremely difficult and time-consuming to do so. Over 65% said that the unit training schedule is not stable, and therefore it is difficult to plan training. Over 62% indicated that BTMS (The Battalion Training Management System) is not working the way they were taught it's supposed to work. This understandably caused over 79% to indicate that they rarely get the time to give their subordinates the training they need. If all these perceptions are true, no wonder senior officers and NCO's perceive problems in the way junior NCO's train. But whose fault is it?

TURBULENCE

Tankers have worried about turbulence for years. One of the most often heard excuses for a poor showing in tank gunnery is turbulence. Armor company and battalion commanders in many units are required to keep track of it and in some cases show cause to higher authority for changing soldiers from one tank crew to another.

Turbulence has essentially been ignored in infantry. But now is the time to take the lid off the infantry unit and look inside to see how much movement exists between squads and platoons. For soon these units will be issued an infantry tank—the Bradley. Someone will undoubtedly require the crew to successfully negotiate a gunnery range, and if positive action isn't taken now, turbulence will again become "The Excuse."



Corporals, SGT's and SSG's transferred to other units


within the past:

6 months

12 months

FIGURE III-5: NCO TURBULENCE

An unbelievable o5.4% of the NCO's in mechanized infantry rifle squads have changed squads within the past six months. If turbulence such as this continues, the Regimental System is doomed to failure, since the cohesion of the small work group is the most important aspect to motivation. As can be seen from this figure, our junior NCO's are continually required to get to know a new group of subordinates and develop a training program for them based on their strengths and weaknesses. Tough! But to make matters worse, the E4 and below in squads are at least as turbulent as the junior NCO's.



E4 and below transferred to other units

within the past:

6 months

2 12 months

FIGURE 111-6: E4 AND BELOW TURBULENCE

One can quickly see that NCO turbulence is higher within a six-month period than the turbulence their subordinates experience. But within a 12-month period, soldiers E4 and below move more frequently.

The Bradley is a complex, sophisticated piece of equipment. Two of the NCO's in the squad must operate the fire control and armament systems, which requires hours of time on training devices and in crew drill, not to mention mini- and main-gun range time. The third NCO should have responsibility for the soldiers who ride in the back of the vehicle. With the new vehicle, his tasks will essentially be identical to those which at least two NCO's perform with the M113. Excessive turbulence as currently experienced in mechanized infantry units cannot be allowed to continue or the weapons system capability of the Bradley will never be achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

In many ways the junior infantry NCO has the toughest job in the Army for he must train subordinates on the M16 rifle, M60 and .50 caliber machine-guns, the M203 grenade launcher and the DRAGON. He also must be able to navigate and tactically move his squad mounted and dismounted. He is also responsible for training his men on Soldier's Manual Tasks. He must also participate in post support requirements, details, and prepare for inspections. That is a big order. But soon the M2 will replace the M113. The .50 caliber machinegun will be replaced with the TOW, Bushmaster, and a co-ax machinegun—none of which can be dismounted. Therefore, our infantry squad NCO must, more than ever before, coordinate the actions of the carrier team and maneuver team. He must also operate as a member of a tank crew and participate in gunnery exercises. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle has been expended from automotive and suspension to include fire control and armament.

We have programmed the junior infantry NCO for failure and will never achieve the design characteristics of the M2 unless the environment in which he works changes. His subordinates are young and inexperienced. Many are high school dropouts and have no aspirations toward an Army career. Senior NCO's and the officers in units are perceived as not being concerned and not providing the support and assistance wanted and needed by the junior NCO's. When peromoted to NCO, two-thirds are left in the same squad, 80% in the same platoon, which makes the achievement of good discipline almost impossible from the outset. The training systems in the unit appear to be supporting the training managers and the records and reports they feel compelled to compile, rather than the trainer. Finally, junior NCO's and their subordinates are moved so frequently that lack of cohesion is a way of life.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made to ease the burden which the environment places on junior NCO's:

- 1. Continue current policy of no non-high school accessions.
- 2. Create teeth in the NCO Development Program which forces senior NCO's and unit officers to help, support, and develop junior NCO's.
- 3. Require commands to transfer EM promoted to SGT E5 to at least another platoon in the same company.
- 4. Reduce reliance on records and reports to determine if training is being conducted properly. Require commanders to focus on support and cassistance for the trainers.
- 5. Reduce turbulence by making an Army-wide issue of it in mechanized infantry units.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP SKILLS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on responses to survey icems 1-23, 29, 51, and 52, which describe perceptions of the leadership skills of junior NCO's at mechanized infantry squad level.

PERCEPTIONS OF HIGH SKILL

Responses "4" and "5" on all competency questions connotates high skill (good or very good) or high frquency of good leadership practices (usually or always).




FIGURE IV-1: HIERARCHY OF RATINGS OF LEADERSHIP SKILLS

As can be seen in this figure, subordinates rate squad level NCO's significantly lower on the top 10 skills than do superiors and the NCO's themselves. ² Furthermore, while self and peer ratings are identical on

eight of the top ten skills, self-subordinate and superior-subordinate ratings are identical on only one-half the top ten skills. All four rating groups agree on the following four skills:

- #23: When he (junior NCO) tells a soldier to do something, he makes sure it gets done.
- #15: When his squad returns from the field, he stays until all the work is done.
- #51: His overall physical fitness is:
- #8: His personal appearance on duty is sharp.

At least three of these skills (8, 51, and 15) revolve around an NCO setting the example, rather than motivating his men. Three of the groups agree on an additional three tasks:

- #18: In the field, he "plays the game."
- #16: He requires his subordinates to do only those things he would be willing to do himself.
- #13: He is interested in his subordinates as human beings.

Two of these tasks are also broadly categorized as example setting. Only one of the top ten leadership skills possessed by junior NCO's, as perceived by at least three of the rating groups, is in the realm of "bonding" or "belonging"—item #13. It therefore appears that the predominate number of high leadership skills possessed by junior NCO's are passive, in that they require little interaction with others. This could account for a lack of motivation and cohesion in units. Interestingly, of the seven skills just discussed, physical fitness, "playing the game" in the field, and sharp appearance are stressed within PNCOC. Staying until the work is done when returning from the field is normal SOP within the units surveyed.

PERCEPTIONS OF LOW SKILL

Perceptions of low skill have been analyzed two ways: responses "l" and "2" which are the two negative ratings (never/seldom and very bad/bad), and responses "l," "2," and "3" which adds "sometimes" and "ok," the two average responses available. The latter method is believed more valid since an average rating has core negative than positive connotations. 3




FIGURE IV-2: HIERARCHY OF RESPONSES ON BOTTOM 10 LEADERSHIP SKILLS

This chart once again points out that subordinates are the most critical of junior NCO's; junior NCO's are the least critical of themselves.

All four rating groups agree on the following three skills in the bottom 10:4

#12: He insures that if his subordinates do a good job, they are rewarded.

#19: When he makes a mistake, he admits it.

#9: If one of his subordinates teaches a class to his squad, he stays around to help and evaluate the instructor. Notice that all three of these tasks involve interaction between junior NCO's and their subordinates. An additional six tasks are agreed upon by at least three of the rating groups as being in the bottom 10:

- #20: He acts the same toward his subordinates, regardless of who is around.
- #52: His attitude toward the Army is:
- #7: He insures that when his subordinates mess up, they receive the proper punishment.
- #1: He thoroughly prepares for the classes he teaches.
- #4: He evaluates fairly his subordinates' good and bad performances.
- #10: He works hard.

Another four of these tasks (20, 7, 1, and 4) also involve interaction with troops. Thus, seven of the bottom 10 leadership skills involve interaction between junior NCO's and soldiers.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND RATER DEMOGRAPHICS

Subordinates

Very few of the leadership skills correlate to subordinate demographics.

The younger subordinates are, the higher they rate their squad level NCO's in:

- (#4) Their evaluation of good and bad performance.
- (#8) Their appearance.
- (#12) Rewarding those subordinates who deserve it.
- (#12) Their treatment of subordinates like human beings.

Three of these skills involve NCO-soldier interaction, which apparently degenerates the older the subordinates become.

It is interesting that subordinate civilian education level did not correlate to the subordinate rating of any of the 24 leadership skills.

Peers

The higher the level of military education achieved, the higher peers rated each other in six leadership skills, four of which involved interaction between the NCO's and their subordinates. Such correlation is understandable since leadership subjects increase at higher levels of NCOES.

Superiors

Generally speaking, the higher the rank of PSG's and the older they are, the higher they rate junior NCO's in leadership skills. On the other hand, the longer PSG's are assigned to their current platoon or company, the lower they rate their subordinate NCO's in leadership tasks.

Summary

An almost insignificant number of leadership skills correlate with rater demographics. Those that do correlate tend to be negative: the longer the rater is exposed to junior NCO's the lower he rates them. The exceptions are those peer ratings which increase as raters achieve higher education levels of NCOES.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND UNIT ENVIRONMENT

The environment the rater works in can be shown to have a significant relationship to how he rates junior NCO's. In general, the more positive or supportive the environment, the higher the ratings. For example, PSG's who rate the professional development programs in their companies high, also rate junior NCO's high in the following skills:

- (1) Thorough preparation for classes.
- (10) Hard work.

- (11) Insuring subordinates have all their gear prior to departing for the field.
- (21) Treating all subordinates the same.

 The higher junior NCO's rate the treatment and support they receive from senior NCO's and officers in the unit, the higher they rate each other in:
 - (4) Fairly evaluating good and bad performances.
 - (12) Rewarding those subordinates who deserve it.
 - (13) Treating subordinates like human beings.
 - (14) Being loyal to the chain of command.
 - (19) Admitting mistakes.

- (21) Treating all subordinates the same.
- (52) Being positive in attitude toward the Army.

Finally, ratings of unit effectiveness correlate significantly to the perceived leadership competency of junior NCO's.




FIGURE IV-3: RELATIONSHIP OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS TO LEADERSHIP

Subordinates and peers correlate ratings of unit effectiveness to 80% and 90% of NCO leadership skills, respectively—a very high correlation. PSG's only correlate unit effectiveness to 50% of junior leadership skills, primarily since PSG's measure effectiveness at the company level (where junior NCO's contribute a portion) while peers and subordinates measure effectiveness at squad level where junior NCO's play a much more significant role.

CONCLUSIONS

Most leadership skills in which junior NCO's have achieved a perceived high level of competency are in the category of setting the example.

Unfortunately, most leadership skills in which junior NCO's are perceived to possess a low level of competency require positive interaction between them and their subordinates. This could be the heart of the junior leadership problem. High motivation of subordinates has been determined by many to occur after members of a unit "bond" together and possess feelings of "belonging" to a group. NCO's who understand the phenomenon know the importance of positive interaction between all members of the small group (squad) to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, as pointed out in the survey, a significant number of NCO's do not understand this issue which has an adverse impact on motivation and cohesion. The key to "turning on" young soldiers is through their squad level NCO's!

Another important conclusion is that a positive, supportive environment generates greater perceptions of junior NCO leadership. If unit commanders and senior NCO's support the junior NCO's, they seem to grow in ability more positively and rapidly.

Finally, significant relationships exist between perceptions of unit effectiveness and junior NCO leadership competency. Those who perceive high competency in the leadership skills of junior NCO's also perceive high effectiveness of their units.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Every level of NCOES should contain leadership classes which deal in the interaction between NCO's and their subordinates. Being able to set the example is not enough. Unit commanders must be required to focus on the needs of junior NCO's. Such support and assistance has proven to be instrumental in raising the leadership competency of those NCO's.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. See surveys at Appendix 2.

2. Jr. NCO's are perceived to have high leadership competency in the following skills:

Subordinates	Self	Peer	Superior
23	15	15	15
11	18	8	51
8	23	51	8
15	17	23	16
29	51	18	2
51	13	2	5
14	8	13	20
18	10	11	13
7	16	17	23
52	21	16	14

- 3. This has been on the advice of Dr. Kimmel, ARI. As an aside, very little difference exists between the conclusions drawn from analysis of responses "1, 2, and 3" in aggregate and "1 and 2" in aggregate.
- 4. Jr. NCO's are perceived to have low leadership competency in the following skills:

Subordinates	Self	Peer	Superior
12	52	12	ን
16	12	9	1
13	29	52	12
10	7	7	4
6	1	10	10
19	9	6	29
2	14	19	23
20	20	1	19
21	4	4	9
9	19	20	· 52

CHAPTER V

PERCEIVED TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF JUNIOR NCO'S

INTRODUCTION

Survey questions 24-50, less 29, measured the technical competence of junior NCO's in terms of how frequently they demonstrated high competence or whether they merely demonstrated competence or incompetence. This chapter summarizes the results of these surveys.

PERCEPTIONS OF HIGH SKILL

As in leadership, high skill in technical competence tasks is characterized by responses "4" or "5."




FIGURE V-1: HIERARCHY OF HIGH TECHNICAL COMPETENCE SKILLS

Figure V-l illustrates that subordinates and peers rate the top ten technical competence skills of junior NCO's significantly lower, on the average, than do PSG's and junior NCO's themselves. All four of the rater groups agree on the following skills:

#37: Ability to operate the M16 rifle.

#50: Ability to set head space and timing on the .50 caliber MG.

#42: Ability to use the compass.

#48: Ability to operate the M60 MG.

Notice that all these skills are mechanical and each has been required in one form or another on the last several 11B SQT's.

Five additional skills were common to at least three rater groups. They are:

#26: Knowledge of how to prevent cold weather injuries.

#30: Knowledge of basic first aid.

#35: Ability to conduct PMCS on an M113.

#40: Ability to fill out DA Form 2404.

#49: Ability to perform garrison maintenance on the M113.

These skills are again either mechanical or SQT related (except for #26 which is of prime importance to the chain of command throughout Europe). In fact, weapons, garrison maintenance, and first aid account for over 70% of the skills identified by all rater groups in the top ten. Interestingly, only 30% of the top 10 skills are typically performed in the field.

PERCEPTIONS OF LOW SKILL

Responses "1," "2," and "3" (average) were combined to display perceptions of low competence in technical skills. 2




FIGURE V-2: HIERARCHY OF LOW TECHNICAL COMPETENCY PERCEPTIONS

As seen in Figure V-2, superiors, on the average, rate junior NCO's lower than subordinates and peers. Self ratings once again tended to favor the rater (ratee).

All four of the rater groups agreed on the following five skills:

#36: Ability to teach an interesting class.

#24: Knowledge of M113 crew drill.

#34: Ability to navigate mounted on an M113.

#28: Knowledge of defensive tactics.

#39: Ability to use chemical detections devices.

Four of the five tasks are normally performed in the field environment.

Also, rather than being mechanical, they require in-depth knowledge or ability that in many instances can only be obtained through practice. An additional four tasks are agreed upon by at least three of the rater groups. They are:

#25: Knowledge of dismounted patrolling techniques.

#41: Ability to effectively use training aids.

#43: Ability to perform field maintenance.

#38: Ability to read a map.

Three of these tasks are again normally performed in the field. In fact, over 70% of the tasks identified by all four rater groups are performed in the field.

RECAP OF COMPETENCE CATEGORIES

All four rater groups agree that junior NCO's possess the most technical competence in weapons, first aid, and communications, and the least technical competence in training and tactics. NCOES cannot be blamed for junior NCO competence shortcomings. The curriculum for PNCOC/PLDC through ANCOC is heavy in these skills. But unit commanders are being encouraged to concentrate more on individual skills and collective training in local training areas (LTA's) rather than spending the necessary time, coordination effort, and money to go to the field. Our soldiers and NCO's appear to be weakest at what will be the most important if we must fight—that of working as teams on the battlefield. Tactics, land navigation, chemical detection, and field maintenance represent glaring technical competence deficiencies that must be solved. Tactics, field maintenance, and mounted land navigation will become extremely more critical when the Bradley is fielded.

CORRELATIONS OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE TO RATER DEMOGRAPHICS

Subordinates

No significant correlations exist between the demographics of subordinates and how they perceive the technical competence of junior NCO's.

Peers

The higher the military education of peers, the higher were their ratings of each other on the following skills:

#26: Knowledge of how to prevent cold weather injuries.

#30: Knowledge of basic first aid.

#31: Ability to road march in the M113.

#33: Knowledge of how to wear chemical protective clothing.

#37: Ability to operate the M16 rifle.

Superiors

The longer they are in a platoon, the lower PSG's rate junior NCO's on eight technical competence tasks. Also, the longer PSG's are in a company, the lower they rate junior NCO's on five technical skills. All but two of these tasks are normally performed in the field. The infrequency with which units go to the field could, therefore, account for lower ratings over time.

CORRELATIONS OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE TO RATER ENVIRONMENT

Subordinates

No significant correlations exist.

Peer

The more officers and senior NCO's are perceived to be supportive of junior NCO's, the higher junior NCO's rate each other in six technical skills. Also, the better peers perceived NCOES to prepare them to be NCO's, the higher they rated technical competence in five additional skills.

Superiors

The higher PSG's perceived the value of the unit's professional development program, the higher they rated junior NCO technical competence in 14 skills.

This is significant, for it demonstrates the positive effect a good professional

development program has on the perceptions senior NCO's have of junior NCO's.

Hopefully, that perception is the result of the junior NCO's being more fully developed than would be the case in units where professional development programs are not perceived positively.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, the technical competence of junior NCO's is not too bad. 79% of all raters selected responses "4" or "5" to the top ten technical competence skills, while only 7.6% of all raters selected responses "1" or "2" to the bottom ten.

But some significant deficiencies do exist in the technical competence of junior NCO's. While high technical skill exists in those garrison tasks that are mechanical or individual in nature, low skill is prevalent in field tasks that are essentially collective and which require junior NCO's to interact with others. Junior NCO's also are perceived to possess low skill levels in their ability to train or teach others.

The TRADOC NCOES blueprint has been successful in training young NCO's and prospective NCO's on individual tasks. But units have not done well in training this group in collective, interactive tasks. The fielding of the Bradley will make unit development programs essential, and it is asserted that TRAPOC must revamp NCOES to accommodate the Bradley.

ARTEP results in the units are historically excellent. Few units are ever rated "not combat ready." And yet, junior NCO's are consistently perceived to have low skill proficiency in the subtasks that make up an ARTEP. I believe this is a result of too much emphasis being placed on battalion ARTEP's and not enough on squad ARTEPS. Few senior officers would know it if squad ARTEPS were not conducted in a unit. Even fewer take the time to observe the ARTEP. And fewer

still take the time to review the evaluation plan and after-action critique/
review. And yet, platoons and companies and battalions and divisions cannot
win without proficient squads.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To solve the problems identified above, the following recommendations are made:

- With the advent of the Bradley, change PNCOC/PLDC to MOS unique modules. Teach gunnery, crew drill and collective skills.
- 2. Once the Bradley is fielded, report results of squad ARTEP's in DA Form 2715. This should focus attention on the combat readiness of weapons systems rather than organizations that "always" pass.
- 3. Encourage unit commanders to emphasize squad level tactical training.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Perceptions of the top ten technical competence skills possessed by Junior $\ensuremath{\mathsf{NCO's}}$:

Subordinates	Peer	Superior	<u>Self</u>
37	* 37	37	37
50	50	30	50
42	40	50	42
44	42	48	44
4()	48	40	40
3 5	26	33	35
30	35	49	30
38	31	26	38
48	· 45	42	48
33	49	31	33

- 2. Responses "1" and "2" in combination produced almost identical results.
- 3. Perceptions of the bottom ten technical competence skills possessed by Junior NCO's:

Subordinates	Peer	Superior	Self
24	36	36	39
36	24	39	24
34	34	24	43
28	25	34	34
39	41	28	28
25	27	25	36
41	39	41	38
43	26	43	31
47	28	38	46
38	45	27	32

CHAPTER VI

LEADERSHIP VERSUS TECHNICAL COMPETENCE

INTRODUCTION

Now that leadership and technical competence have been discussed separately, it is appropriate to compare the relative importance of each category.

ANALYSIS OF MEANS

An analysis of all four rater groups indicates that within the top ten means, technical skills outnumber leadership skills, while the reverse is true in the bottom ten means. $^{\rm l}$




FIGURE VI-1: COMPARISON OF % LEADERSHIP TASK CONTENT IN TOP TEN AND BOTTOM TEN COMPETENCY MEANS

This figure illustrates that leadership tasks comprized only 32% of the skills all four rater groups placed in the top ten. Obviously, the other 68%

were technical competence skills. In the bottom ten, all four rater groups listed 55% leadership skills. This leads to the conclusion that, overall, squad level NCO's seem to be proficient in technical areas and not proficient in leadership areas. But this bears closer examination.




FIGURE VI-2: COMPARISON OF TOP TEN AND BOTTOM TEN MEANS OF EACH RATER GROUP WITH RATIO OF LEADERSHIP TO TECHNICAL COMPETENCE SKILLS

Figure VI-2 clearly shows that most of the change from a technical competence weighting in the top ten to a leadership weighting in the bottom ten is due to the ratings of subordinates and peers. Self ratings and superior ratings rather consistently place more technical competence skills in both the top and bottom ten means. This could result from superiors evaluating their subordinate NCO's against measurable standards (technical competence) which in turn, through feedback, would cause the junior NCO's to see themselves in the same light. The subordinates, however, view the junior NCO in a much different light. To achieve results, the junior NCO must usually motivate his men. Obviously, the way this motivation is achieved bothers subordinates and a significant number of peers.

All four rater groups agree on the following five skills in the top ten means:

#37: Ability to operate the M16.

#50: Ability to set head space and timing on the .50 caliber MG.

#48: Ability to operate the M60 MG.

#15: When his squad returns from the field, staying until all the work is done.

#42: Ability to use a compass.

An additional four skills are agreed upon by at least three cf the rater groups. They are:

#44: Ability to decontaminate himself and his equipment.

#40: Ability to fill out a DA Form 2404 on the M113.

#18: In the field, he "plays the game."

#30: Knowledge of basic first aid.

Again, notice that only two of these skills (15 and 18) are leadership.

Within the bottom ten, all four rater groups agree on the following skills:

#12: He insures that if his subordinates do a good job, they are rewarded.

#36: Ability to teach an interesting class.

An additional three skills were identified by at least three rater groups, as follows:

#39: Ability to use chemical detection devices.

#34: Ability to navigate from an M113.

#24: Knowledge of M113 crew drill.

Although only one of these tasks is leadership (#12), three of the remaining four require considerable interaction between the squad NCO's and his sub-ordinates, peers, and superiors.

ANALYSIS OF FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION

The distribution of responses on each question, in aggregate, is very similar to that just presented.




FIGURE VI-3: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES OF ALL FOUR RATER - GROUPS INTO RATIO OF LDSP/TECH COMPETENCE

As displayed in this figure, the lower, or more negative the responses became, the greater the number of leadership skills listed. Subordinates and peers, as previously discussed, account for most of the slope of the line in Figure VI-3.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH UNIT EFFECTIVENESS PERCEPTIONS

Each of the rater groups was required to assess the effectiveness of their units. Correlation analysis was then generated between those assessments and each of the fifty skills in the survey questionnaire.




FIGURE VI-4: DENSITY OF SKILLS THAT CORRELATE TO PERCEPTIONS OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS

This figure shows that all three rater groups examined correlated unit effectiveness perceptions with more leadership skills than technical competence skills. It also demonstrates that peers and subordinates view leadership skills as being tied very closely to unit effectiveness. Superiors, who view unit effectiveness at the company level, do not feel that squad level NCO's are as important.

CORRELATION ANALYSIS--GENERAL

An attempt was made to determine what demographic characteristics of junior NCO's caused the rater groups to respond as they did on competency questions. Some interesting results were achieved.

First of all, the higher the rank of the squad NCO, the higher all four groups rated his competency on an average of 2.75 leadership skills and 8.25 technical skills. PSG's placed the most reliance on rank, positively

correlating higher rank to higher competence in 24 of 50 tasks. Subordinates, on the other hand, only correlated 6 of 50 tasks to rank. Of interest also is the predominance of technical skills versus leadership skills.

The longer junior NCO's are in the unit (Co, PLT, SQD), the higher their competency is rated in an average of 1 leadership skill and 8.25 technical skills. Once again, technical skill correlation is the dominant category. Peers placed the most reliance on time in the unit, correlating it to 20 of 50 tasks overall. Subordinates only correlated 5 of 50 tasks to length of time junior NCO's had been in the unit—and none of the tasks were leadership.

The higher the level of NCOES attended by squad level NCO's, the more competent they are perceived by all four rater groups on an average of about 5 leadership and 5 technical skills each. Subordinates place heavy reliance on this factor, correlating level of NCOES to higher competency in 20 of 50 tasks, 14 of which are leadership. This seems to say that as squad NCO's acquire more military education, their leadership ability improves.

Closely related to the level of NCOES, is the perception squad level NCO's have about the training they received preparing them to be an NCO. All four rater groups indicated that an average of 5 leadership and 4 technical skills improved in competency the better the junior NCO perceived his preparatory training. Subordinates again had the highest number of correlations with 23 of 50, 14 of which were again leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, junior NCO's are perceived to possess higher competency in technical skills than leadership skills and lower competency in leadership skills than technical skills. Subordinates and peers in particular view

junior NCO's in this manner. Such data is to be expected, however, since technical skills dominate the PNCOC/PLDC courses.

All rater groups correlate more leadership than technical skills to perceptions of unit effectiveness. This may well indicate that a well-led, disciplined, cohesive, unit is more effective than one which is merely technically competent.

The higher junior NCO's are in a unit and the higher their rank, the more competent they are perceived to be in technical skills. But very few leadership skills correlate with these factors, which may indicate that leadership development may not be going on in the unit. The higher the level of NCOES attended, however, the higher all groups rated the competency of junior NCO's in both leadership and technical skills. But conversely, the lower the level of NCOES, the lower those ratings of competency. Potential exists for exposing the NCO aspirant to leadership skills during PNCOC/PLDC so he can become effective upon being promoted, rather than having to wait for BNCOC or ANCOC to gain insight into key leadership issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To solve the above mentioned problems, the following recommendations are made:

- Add "interactive" leadership instruction to PNCOC/PLDC.
- 2. Require units to conduct leadership development programs.
- 3. Advertise the fact that virtually all rater groups view the linkage between unit effectiveness and leadership as stronger than the linkage between unit effectiveness and technical competence.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. Below are listed the top ten and bottom ten skills in terms of mean responses:

TOP 10			BOTTOM 19				
Subordinate	<u>Self</u>	Peer	Super ior	Subordinate	Self	Peer	Superior
37	15	37	37	12	39	12	36 .
11	37	50	50	15	34	34	39
50	42	15	48	13	24	39	34
42	50	42	15	9	52	9	12
23	18	30	42	36	43	24	24
44	48	44	40	6	12	36	2.5
48	30	18	51	10	29	19	28
38	17	48	18	19	36	52	1
15	44	40	30	20	28	1	7
40	13	26	2	21	7	6	41

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANALYSIS OF STUDY METHODS USED

The use of an opinion survey is an excellent vehicle to measure the perceived effectiveness of junior NCO's. The author would have preferred using actual, measurable performance indicators to determine NCO effectiveness, but such measures do not exist in a consistently implemented manner in like units in the Army. Tankers use gunney tables to measure the proficiency of tank crews and platoons and although ranges vary from one division to another, results can be somewhat compared. Infantry units currently lack this opportunity.

Not much effort is expended in insuring high quality control in the administration of squad ARTEP's. Most effort is expended at battalion level where the company commander and above are stressed, while soldiers act as training aids.

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

Considerably more attention needs to be given to squad and platoon

ARTEP's, especially when the Bradley is fielded. Since the squads' most

potent systems (TOW and Bushmaster) cannot be dismounted, the interaction

and coordination between the carrier team and maneuver team will be critical.

Squad and platoon tactics, crew drill and good basic fire and maneuver will

require considerable practice.

RELIABILITY OF THE FINDINGS

Statistically, the results of the questionnaire analysis were extremely valid. No correlation was excepted unless the "P" value was .01 or lower.

Additionally, the sample size of junior NCO's exceeded 100 and therefore statistically approximates all mechanized infantry squad level NCO's.

Although the data came from only one division, the wide geographical distribution of soldiers in the division to four different cities makes it possible to state that the data approximates reality in all mechanized infantry units.

Comments from AWC classmates who commanded infantry units in other divisions in both CONUS and USAREUR state that similar conditions existed in their units. It is therefore asserted that the statistics presented in this study approximate reality in all mechanized infantry units in the Army. In fact, to interject a little author bias, the 8th MECH is probably a little better off than most due to recent priority being placed on junior NCO development, individual training and stabilization of training schedules by its Commander, MG Carl Vuono.

STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS

Infantry squad-level NCO's are relatively competent in individual, mechanically oriented technical skills and in those leadership skills which are categorized as "setting the example," but are weak in those technical and leadership skills which involve teamwork and interaction and which, when competent, produce high motivation and unit cohesion. This latter category of skills is not taught in those levels of NCOES available to the NCO aspirant or even the young NCO. He is expected to learn them on the job. But few units have viable junior NCO development programs. Further, the environment in which the NCO works mitigates against mastery of these skills. Many of his subordinates are high school dropouts who have no intention of staying in the Army. Senior NCO's and officers are perceived as not really wanting to help develop the junior NCO's. And finally, junior NCO's and their subordinates are moved so frequently that it is no wonder that cohesion is evasive at best.

All these factors might be palatable if units were filled with the authorized number of NCO's. But a 36% shortage of NCO's at squad level exists. In fact, only three squads of 117 surveyed had the full complement of authorized NCO's in the proper grade.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Conditions which exist in infantry units today, while undesirable, will create disaster if allowed to continue once the Bradley is fielded. To attempt to maximize the weapons system capability of the Bradley, the following recommendations are made:

1. Fill mechanized infantry squads to TOE strength. This may require overstrenghts at division level. But commanders must be made to feel guilty when requiring an 11B E5/E6 to work SD out of his MOS. Consideration should be given to keeping track of soldiers by where they work, rather than where they are assigned by UMR.

- 2. Consider using two MOS' in the Bradley. An 11M MOS for the carrier team, which rarely dismounts, and 11B's for those that ride in the rear of the vehicle. Insufficient time exists for the carrier crew to learn dismounted tasks and gunnery and maintenance tasks and the maneuver team will have difficulty finding time to learn gunnery and maintenance tasks. Squad leaders do not have time to train their squads in all the individual and collective tasks required today with the M113. With the Bradley, it will be virtually impossible. Thus, the weapons system capability will be jeopardized.
- 3. Reduce turbulence in mechanized infantry units by making it an Armywide issue. The lack of stability at squad and platoon level, if allowed to continue, will destroy the Regimental System's goals of cohesion and enhanced motivation.

- 4. Require units to transfer EM promoted to E5 at date of promotion as Army policy.
- 5. Continue policy of no non-high school accessions.

- 6. Create teeth in NCO development programs which force senior NCO's and officers to assist, support, and develop junior NCO's.
- 7. Reduce reliance on records and reports to determine if training is being properly conducted. Require commanders to focus on support and assistance for trainers. (Too much energy is spent in training management; not enough energy in training!)
- 8. Insert interactive leadership skills in every leve! of NCOES. Also insert modules on training. NCO's do not understand "performance oriented training," do not teach interesting classes, do not thoroughly prepare for classes, and do not use training aids well.
- 9. As the Bradley is fielded, create MOS unique modules in PNCOC/PLDC. This system is too complex to permit the luxury of "general" training. Modules in gunnery, crew drill, fire and maneuver, training, tactics, maintenance, and leadership should comprise most of the course.
- 10. Revise the DA Form 2715 to report unit effectiveness by weapons systems. Squad ARTEP results, personnel working, NOT MERELY ASSIGNED, in squads as a ratio, to authorized, and maintenance status should be reported. Gunnery results should also be reported once firing tables and ranges have been created.

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COL Sklar (15)



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONN

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAPE-ZBR

Major General Jack N. Merritt Commandant US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

Dear Genera

Thank you for your letter of 20 July 1981 inviting me to participate in the Military Studies Program. I would definitely like to participate.

There are three areas of concern to me which I believe will also serve as excellent topics of research for your students. The first is the area of our reenlistment and compensation policies. Are they mutually supportive and do they together support our overall objective of manning the force with the righ kind of soldiers? The second area is that of junior NCO leadership. DA semiannual, world-wide opinion surveys of commanders on a range of thirteen to sixteen personnel issues have consistently identified poor junior MCO leadership as the personnel problem having the most detrimental impact on their unit's readiness. What's the extent of the problem? What are the underlying reasons and what should the Army do to solve this problem? The third area is that of manpower, personnel, and training requirements for materiel system acquisitions, sometimes called soldier-machine interface. This is a very complex issue and has been the subject of many, many studies and papers, both completed and ongoing. Perhaps your group could help me by sorting through all the available information and coming up with some solid, substantive recommendations on how we in the personnel community could help solve this problem.

I am confident that you will find one or more of these areas suitable for your students to tackle in the Military Studies Program and look forward to working with your students.

My initial POC for this is LTC Tad Ono, who is in my Research, Studies, and Analysis Office, AV 227-6700/225-0516.

Sincerely.

Lieufenant General, GS Deputy Chief of Staff

Personnel

APPENDIX 1

53

MEMORANDUM THRU CHIEF, LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMNNE TECHNICAL AREA

FOR LTC RICHARD SKLAR, USAWC

SUBJECT: Junior NCO Effectiveness Surveys

The three (3) surveys on junior NCO competencies as perceived by subordinates, peers/self, and superiors has been approved by ARI and the MILPERCEN Review Boards subject to the following changes:

- 1. Delete item #3 ("He is honest") from all surveys and replace with "he treats all squad members fairly."
- @. Delete item 22 ("he is prejudiced") from all surveys.
- 3. Reword Item #52 to read, "His overall attitude toward the Army is".

These changes should be made on all questionnaires prior to administration.

MELVIN J. KIMMEL, Ph. D. Research Psychologist

The Milpercen Clearance number is: ATZI-NCR-MA-82-11a (subordinates)

-11b (peers/seld)

-11c (superiors)

The clearence ID number must appear on the frunt of each form.

SSN	(LAST 4)	BN_	<u> </u>
		co_	
		PLT_	
	•	SQD	34

JUNIOR NCO EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIT PERFORMANCE

Survey Number 1 (Subordinate)

This survey is being administered as part of an Army War College - HQDA

DCSPER - Army Research Institute Joint Study which has the goal of identifying and implementing personnel management and training policies that will increase the effectiveness of Junior Noncommissioned Officers Army-wide.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a)

TITLE OF FORM
Junior NCO Effectiveness and Unit Performance

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY
10 USC Sec 4503

ATZ1- NCR- MA - 82-11a

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested, they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how often the NCOs in your squad do certain things. At the front of the room are a list of the names of the NCO's in your squad that correspond to the numbers on this survey form. On each question you are to rate each NCO in your squad from "1" (never) to "5" (always). If you do not know or the task is not applicable, place the number "6" in the appropriate block.

E 17	4 3	-	•	τ
H X	Δ.	MР	ч.	. н
				ıc

Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6

He eats in the Mess Hall.

1 2 3 4 2 5

Sometimes Usually Always N/A

(NCO #1 "usually" eats in the Mess Hall so "4" was entered in Block #1. NCO #2 "seldom" eats in the Mess Hall, and NCO #3 always eats in the Mess Hall, so "2" and "5" were entered in Blocks "2" and "3" respectively.)

Seldom

Never

		l	2	3	08ua 4	•	5	6 6	
1.	He thoroughly prepares	·	* ",	· ***	_ 1	2	3		
	the classes he teaches								
2.	He insures that if I r I get to go to the PAG					2	3		
3.					1	2	3		
4.	No ovoluvno fointe es				_1_	2	3		
4.	He evaluates fairly my and bad performances.	, good				,			
5.	His off-duty behavior good example for the s				1	2	3		
,	***				1	2	3		
6.	When I perform mainter he is there to help ar								
-	vise me.				_1	2	3		
7.	He insures that if I mup, I receive the propunishment.								

Continue on Next Page

Seldom

Never

Sometimes Usually Always N/A

23. When he tells a soldier to do something, he makes sure it gets done.

	1	2	 3	
3	,		1	

Go to Part 2 on the next page

EXAMPLE

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

Knowledge of how to road

Knowledge of how to change

march in the M113.

track on the M113.

31.

This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how much knowledge the MCOs in your squad have in certain areas and how good they are in performing certain tasks. For each question rate each NCO in your squad from "1" (very bad) to "5" (very good), depending on each NCO's capability. If you do not know, or the question is not applicable, place "6" in the appropriate block.

Bad

2

OK

3

Good

Very Good

N/A

Very Bad

Knowledge of dismounted drill.	1 2 3
("1" was selected for NCO #1 since he makes numerous march the unit. NCO #2, however, received a "5" since unit. NCO #3 is about average, so he received a "3".	he is the best in the
24. Knowledge of M113 crew drill.	1 2 3
25. Knowledge of squad dismounted patrolling techniques.	1 2 3
26. Knowledge of how to prevent cold weather injuries.	$\begin{array}{c c} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ \hline & 1 & 2 & 3 \end{array}$
27. Knowledge of RTO (Radio- Telephone Operator) procedures.	1 2 3
28. Knowledge of defensive tactics.	1 2 3
29. Knowledge of the tasks in my Soldier's Manual.	1 2 3
30. Knowledge of basic first aid.	1 2 3

Continue on the back of this page

2

3

		1	2	3
33.	maintenance of chemical			
	protective clothing.	1	2	3
34.	Ability to navigate from an M113.			
		1	2	3
35.	Ability to conduct PMCS (Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services) on the M113.			
	and betvices, on the MIFS.	1	2	3
36.	Ability to teach an interesting class.			
		1	2	3
37.	Ability to operate an M16 rifle.			
		1	2	3
38.	Ability to read a map.			
		1	2	3
39.	Ability to use chemical detection devices.			
		1	2	3
40.	Ability to fill out a DA Form 2404 on the M113.			
		1	2	3
41.	Ability to effectively use training aids while teaching			
	classes.	1	2	3
42.	Ability to use a compass.			
		1	2	3
43.	Ability to perform field expedient maintenance on the			
	M113 in the field.	1	2	3
44.	Ability to decontaminate him- self and his equipment.			

Continue on next page

45. Ability to operate the DRAGON.

46. Ability to operate all squad radios and intercoms.

	Very Bad Bad OK (4 4	Very Good 5	N/A 6
47.	Ability to navigate dismounted.		1 2 3	
48.	Ability to operate the M60 machine gun.		1 2 3	
49.	Ability to perform basic crew level maintenance on the M113 in the motor pool.		1 2 3] .
50.	Ability to set head space and timing on the .50 caliber machine gun.		1 2 3	
51.	His overall physical fitness is:			
52.	His overall attitude >: Toward The Army	k.	1 2 3	

Continue on the back of this page

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to answer questions about realf and your unit. Circle only one answer per question.

- 53. The overall combat effectiveness of my squad is:
 - 1. Not effective.
 - 2. Slightly effective.
 - 3. Effective.
 - 4. Very effective.
 - 5. Extremely effective.
- 54. Compared to all other units I haver ever served in, my current squad is:
 - 1. A lot worse.
 - 2. Slightly worse.
 - 3. About the same.
 - 4. Slightly better.
 - 5. A lot better.

- 55. To make my squad the most effective:
 - 1. Many improvements are needed.
 - 2. Quite a few improvements are needed.
 - 3. Few improvements are needed.
 - 4. Very few improvements are needed.
 - 5. No improvements are needed.
- 56. I have been in the Army:
 - 1. 6 months or less.
 - 2. 7-12 months.
 - 3. 13-18 months.
 - 4. 19-24 months.
 - 5. More than 24 months.

Continue on the next page

والأراج الأراقيان

- 57. I have been in my current company:
 - 1. 1 month or less.
 - 2. 2-4 months.
 - 3. 5-6 months.
 - 4. 7-12 months.
 - 5. More than 12 months.
- 58. I have been in my current platoon:
 - 1. 1 month or less.
 - 2. 2-4 months.
 - 3. 5-6 months.
 - 4. 7-12 months.
 - 5. More than 12 months.
- 59. I have been in my current squad:
 - 1. 1 month or less.
 - 2. 2-4 months.
 - 3. 5-6 months.

- 4. 7-12 months.
- 5. More than 12 months.
- 60. With regard to civilian education:
 - 1. I graduated from high school before I joined the Army.
 - 2. I did not graduate from high school before I joined the Army.
- 61. With regard to my reenlistment intentions:
 - 1. I definitely plan to reenlist.
 - 2. I will probably reenlist.
 - I am undecided about reenlisting.
 - 4. I probably will not reenlist.
 - 5. I definitely will not reenlist.

Continue on the back of this page

62. My current rai	nk	18
--------------------	----	----

- 1. Pvt E1.
- 2. Pvt E2.
- 3. PFC E3.
- 4. SP4 E4.
- 5. CPI or SGT (NCO).

63. I have been in my current grade:

- 1. 6 months or less.
- 2. 7-12 months.
- 3. 13-18 months.
- 4. 19-24 months.
- 5. More than 24 months.

64. My age is:

- 1. 17-18.
- 2. 19-20.
- 3. 21-23.
- 4. 24-25.
- 5. Older than 25.

JUNIOR NCO EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIT PERFORMANCE

Survey Number 2 (Peer)

This survey is being administered as part of an Army War College - HQDA

DCSPER - Army Research Institute Joint Study which has the goal of identifying and implementing personnel management and training policies that will increase the effectiveness of Junior Noncommissioned Officers Army-wide.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a)

TITLE OF FORM

Junior NCO Effectiveness and Unit Performance

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE AR 70-1

AUTHORITY
 10 USC Sec 4503

ATZI-NCR-MA-82-16

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

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FORM Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how often the NCO's that work at the squad level in your platoon, including yourself, do certain things. Each numbered box on each question represents an NCO whose name appears at the front of the room. On each question write a number from "1" (never) to "5" (always) in each box that most closely describes how frequently the events occur. If you do not know or the task is not applicable, write the number "6" (N/A) in the appropriate box.

EXAMPLE

RATINGS

Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6

He eats in the Mess Hall.

 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9

 2
 5
 4
 3
 1
 5
 2
 3
 5

(NCO number 2, 6, and 9 "always" eat in the mess hall, therefore a "5" was entered into their blocks. NCO number 5 "never" eats in the mess hall, so he was given a number "1".)

Remember, for each question, all NCOs that work in squads in your platoon, including you, are rated in the box number that corresponds to their (your) name on the board in the front of the room.

	Never S	Seldom Sometimes		Ust	4 4	, 	Always 5		N/A 6			
				1	2	3	. 4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	He thoroughly pre classes he teache		r the		<u></u>			. نست.		- ₁	:	1
				1	2	3	4	5.	6	7	8	9
2.	He insures that i need to, they get									,		
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 ,
3.	Ho is hence											
,	W1	.1 1.2		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4.	He evaluates fair good and bad perf											
5.	His off-duty beha	wiew eet	a a aood	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 1
٦.	example for the m		_									
6.	When his squad pe	rforme m	aintananca	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
٥.	he is there to he		•									
7.	He insures that w	hon hio	ouhowdin at oc	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
/.	mess up, they reconnishment.											
8.	His personal appe		n duty ie		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0.	sharp.	arance of	ii udiy 18									
9.	If one of his sub			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	class to his squa to help and evalu			<u> </u>			<u> </u>	L	لــلـ			
10.	He works hard.			1	2	3	4_	5	6	7	8	9
				1	2	3_	4	5	6	7	8	9
11.	Before going to t that his subordin field gear.											
2.	He insures that i	f his sul	hamdimakaa	_1_	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
. 2 •	do a good job, th			<u></u>								
13.	He is interested	in his s	ubordinatos	_1_	2	3	4	<u>5</u>	6	7	8	9_
	as human beings.	In HIS S	anotatustes									
4.	He is loyal to th	e chain	of command	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
. ~ .	in the unit.	c chain	or command	<u></u>								
5.	When his squad re	turna f-	om the	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
٠ ,	field, he stays u											

done.


ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how much knowledge the NCO's that work in squads in your platoon have in certain areas or how good each NCO is in performing certain tasks. Each numbered box on each question represents an NCO whose name appears at the front of the room. On each question, place a number from "l" (very bad) to "5" (very good) in each numbered box that most closely describes the capability of the appropriate NCO. If you do not know or the task is not applicable, place a number "6" (N/A) in the appropriate box.

EXAMPLE				RATING	<u>ss</u>				
	Very Bad 1	Bad OK Good Very Good N/A 2 3 4 5 6						/A 5	
		1	2	3 4	5	6	7	8	9
Knowledge of Dismounted Drive		2	4	3 2	4	6	. 4	2	5

(NCO numbers 2, 5, and 7 were rated "good" in the knowledge of dismounted drill, so the number "4" was placed in their boxes. Since you have never been able to evaluate NCO number 6 conduct dismounted drill, you rated him "N/A" and gave him a "6" in his box.)

	Very Bad Bad OK Good		Very	Good	d	N/.	Α .			
24.	Knowledge of Ml13 crew drill.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
			<u> </u>	<u>L</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		L	<u> </u>
25.	Knowledge of squad dismounted patrolling techniques.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
26.	·	1	2	3	4	5	_ _K	7	8	9
20.	Knowledge of how to prevent cold weather injuries.		<u> </u>	<u>L</u> .	<u> </u>		<u> </u>			
27.	Knowledge of RTO (Radio-Telephone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Operator) Procedures.		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			<u> </u>
28.	Knowledge of Defensive Tactics.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
20	Knowledge of the table to the table	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
29.	Knowledge of the tasks in the skill level 2/3 Soldier's Manual.									
30.	Knowledge of basic first aid.	1	2	3	4	5	·6	7	8	9
J.,	- Dasie Hist alu.									
31.	Knowledge of how to road march in	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	the M113.									



- 32. Knowledge of how to change track on the M113.
- 33. Knowledge of wear and maintenance of chemical protective clothing.
- 34. Ability to navigate from an M113.
- 35. Ability to conduct PMCS (Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services) on the M113.
- 36. Ability to teach an interesting class.
- 37. Ability to operate an M16 rifle.
- 38. Ability to read a map.
- Ability to use chemical detection devices.
- 40. Ability to fill out a DA Form 2404 on the Mll3.
- 41. Ability to effectively use training aids while teaching classes.
- 42. Ability to use a compass.

- 43. Ability to perform field expedient maintenance on the M113 in the field.
- 44. Ability to decontaminate himself and his equipment.
- 45. Ability to operate a DRAGON.
- 46. Ability to operate all squad radios and intercoms.
- 47. Ability to navigate dismounted.
- 48. Ability to operate an M60 machine gun.

,1	2	3	4	5	6.	7 ,	. 8	9
							, ,	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
						:		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
		1						
								·
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
			نـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ	L				
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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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	Very Bad	Bad _.	OK	Good		Ver	y Goo	d	· N	/A	. Page .	
	1	2	3	4		5				6 بنين د	THE A	űź.
49.	Ability to perfor	m basic c	· *A5.4	, 1	·	2 3	4	5 T	······································	*		~ {9
47.	level maintenance in the motor pool	on the M		L		2 3	4	<u> </u>	6	7		
50.	Ability to set he timing on the .50 gun.									<u> </u>		Ó
51.	His overall physi	cal fitne	ess is:			2 3	4	5	6	7	8	9
52.	His overall attit	ude is 1	lowards			2 3	4	5	6	7	8	9

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to answer questions about yourself and your unit. Circle only one answer per quest.

- 53. I have been in the Army:
 - 1. 2 years of less
 - 2. 3-4 years
 - 3. 5-6 years
 - 4. 7-8 years
 - 5. More than 8 years
- 54. I have been in my current company:
 - 1. 1 month or less
 - 2. 2-4 months
 - 3. 5-6 months
 - 4. 7-12 months
 - 5. More than 12 months
- 55. I have been in my current platoon:
 - 1. 1 month or less
 - 2. 2-4 months
 - 3. 5-6 months
 - 4. 7-12 months
 - 5. More than 12 months
- 56. I have been in my current squad:
 - 1. 1 month or less
 - 2. 2-4 months
 - 3. 5-6 months
 - 4. 7-12 months
 - 5. More than 12 months

Continue on the next page

- 57. With regard to civilian education:
 - 1. I graduated from high school before I joined the Army.
 - 2. I did not graduate from high school before I joined the Army.
- 58. With regard to my reenlistment intentions:
 - 1. I definitely plan to reenlist.
 - 2. I will probably reenlist.
 - 3. I am undecided about reenlisting.
 - 4. I probably will not reenlist.
 - 5. I definitely will not reenlist.
- 59. My current rank is:
 - 1. SP4 or below
 - 2. CPL E4
 - 3. SGT E5
 - 4. SSG E6
- 60. I have been in my current grade:
 - 6 months or less
 - 2. 7-12 months
 - 3. 13-18 months
 - 4. 19-24 months

- 5. More than 24 months
- 61. With regard to my marital status:
 - 1. I have never been married.
 - 2. I am divorced (or going through a divorce).
 - 3. I am married and my wife is living with me.
 - 4. I am married and my wife will join me here as soon as quarters become available.
 - 5. I am married but do not intend to bring my wife to Germany.

Continue on the back of this page

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		1	
62.	My age is:	Same and the second	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	1. 20 or less	to the second	. 4 %
	2. 21-23		•
	3. 24-26		
	4. 27-29		
	5. 30 or older		

63. The overall combat effectiveness of my squad is:

- 1. Not effective
- 2. Slightly effective
- 3. Effective
- 4. Very effective
- 5. Extremely effective

64. Compared to all other units I have ever served in, my current squad is:

- 1. A lot worse
- 2. Slightly worse
- 3. About the same
- 4. Slightly better
- 4. Alot better

65. To make my squad the most effective:

- 1. Many improvements are needed
- 2. Quite a few improvement are needed
- 3. Few improvements are needed
- 4. Very few improvements are needed
- 5. No improvements are needed

- 66. The highest military school I've attended is:
 - 1. ANCOC
 - 2. BNCOC
 - 3. PNCOC
 - 4. PLC
 - 5. OSUT/AIT
- 67. With regard to the way my superiors in the company treat me:
 - 1. They always listen to me carefully and take action on my recommendations.
 - 2. They usually listen to me carefully and take action on my recommendations.
 - 3. About half the time they listen to me carefully and take action on my recommendations.
 - 4. They rarely listen to me and seldom take action on my recommendations.
 - 5. They never listen to me carefully and never take action on my recommendations.
 - 68. When a soldier in my company is promoted to SGT E5, he is usually:
 - 1. Transferred to another company.
 - 2. Transferred to another platoon in this company.
 - 3. Transferred to another squad in this platoon.
 - 4. Left in the same squad.
 - 69. With regard to the training I received before being placed in an NCO leadership position:
 - 1. It really prepared me to be an NCO.
 - 2. It sort of prepared me to be an NCO.
 - It did not prepare me to be an NCO.
 - 4. I did not get to attend school before I was promoted.
 - 5. I did not go to school at all.

- 70. With regard to the help the Sas, or NCO's in this outfit give us:
 - 1. They are extremely concerned about my professional development.
 - 2. They are sort of concerned about my professional development.
 - 3. They are not concerned about my professional development.
- 71. With regard to where I live:
 - 1. I live in the barracks.
 - 2. I live with my family in government quarters.
 - 3. I live with my family on the economy.
 - 4. I live by myself on the economy.
 - 5. Although I have a bunk in the barracks, I usually spend my nights off post.
- 72. When I need training aids:

- 1. They are easy to obtain.
- 2. 1 can get them, but it takes alot of effort.
- 3. I seldom get what I need.
- 4. I never get what I need.
- 73. The training schedule in this unit:
 - 1. Never changes after it is published.
 - Seldom changes after it is published.
 - 3. Sometimes changes after it is published.
 - 4. Usually changes after it is published.
 - 5. Always changes after it is published

- 74. The Eattalion Training Management System (BTMS):
 - 1. Is working just like I was taught it should work.
 - 2. Usually works the way it is supposed to work.
 - 3. Sometimes works the way it is supposed to work.
 - 4. Seldom works the way it is supposed to work.
 - 5. Never works the way it is supposed to work.
- 75. With regard to the training of my squad:
 - 1. I know what to do, but am never given the time to do it.
 - 2. I know what to do, but am seldom given the time to do it.
 - 3. I know what to do, and am sometimes given the time to do it.
 - 4. I know what to do, and am usually given the time to do it.
 - 5. I don't know what to do.

SN (last 4)	bn
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JUNIOR NCO EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIT PERFORMANCE

Survey Number 3 (Superior)

This survey is being administered as part of an Army War College - HQDA DCSPER - Army Research Institute Joint Study which has the goal of identifying and implementing personnel management and training policies that will increase the effectiveness of Junior Noncommissioned Officers Army-wide.

DATA	REQUIRED	BY	THE	PRIVACY	ACT	OF	1974
	((5 1	J.S.O	c. 552a)			

TITLE OF FORM
Junior NCO Effectiveness and Unit Performance

PRESCRIBING DIRECTIVE AR 70-1

1. AUTHORITY 10 USC Sec 4503

ATZI-UCE-MA-lic

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

The data collected with the attached form are to be used for research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested, they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses will be raintained in the processing of these data.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual if so desired.

FORM Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75

DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how often the NCO's that work at the squad level in your platoon, do certain things. Each numbered box on each question represents an NCO whose name appears at the front of the room. On each question write a number from "1" (never) to "5" (always) in each box that most closely describes how frequently the events occur. If you do not know or the task is not applicable, write the number "6" (N/A) in the appropriate box.

EXAMPLE	•]	RATIN	<u>GS</u>				
·	Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6									N/A 6
He eats in the Mess Hall.		1	2	3	4	5	6 	7	8	9

(NCO number 2, 6, and 9 "always" eat in the mess hall, therefore a "5" was entered into their blocks. NCO number 5 "never" eats in the mess hall, so he was given a number "1".)

Remember, for each question, all NCOs that work in squads in your platoon, are rated in the box number that corresponds to their name on the board in the front of the room.

	Never 1	Seldom 2	Sometimes 3	Usu	ally 4	7	A1w 5	ays		N/A 6		
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	He thoroughly classes he tea		r the									
2.	He insures the	=		_1_	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	need to, they	get to go t	o the PAC.	!			,	<u> </u>		اا	<u> </u>	
3.			:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
,	No. 2023 - 2020 - 1				2	3	4_	5	6	7	8	9
4.	He evaluates in good and bad p							L				
5.	His off-duty h	anaviar cat	a n good	1_	2	3	4	<u>5</u>	6	7	8	9
,.	example for the		•	L								
6.	When his squad	d parforms m	uninton maa		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0.			upervise them.					<u> </u>				
,	11			_1_	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9_
7.	He insures the mess up, they											
	punishment.			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8_	9
8.	His personal a	appearance o	on duty is									
^	76 6 1.	. 		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8_	9_
9.	If one of his class to his s	squad, he st	ays around									
10.	He works hard.			1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>	16	7	8	9
				<u> </u>				<u> </u>				
			. . .	1_	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11.	Before going that his subor								<u> </u>			
12.	field gear. He insures that	ut if his su	bordinatus	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
12.	do a good job											
13.	Re is interest	tod in his s	uborginates	1_	2	_3	4	5	6	7	8	9_
13.	as human being											
17	No in local to		.e	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14.	He is loyal to in the unit.	o the chain	or command									
15.	When his squad	d raturns fr	om the	1_	2	_3_	4	5_	6	7	8	9_
17.	field, he stay								<u></u>			

20. He acts the same toward his subordinates regardless of who is

21. He treats everyone in his squad the same.

22.

around them.

23. When he tells a soldier to do something, he makes sure it gets done.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5

7

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2

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4

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to indicate how much knowledge the NCO's that work in squads in your platoon have in certain areas or how good each NCO is in performing certain tasks. Each numbered box on each question represents an NCO whose name appears at the front of the room. On each question, place a number from "1" (very bad) to "5" (very good) in each numbered box that most closely describes the capability of the appropriate NCO. If you do not know or the task is not applicable, place a number "6" (N/A) in the appropriate box.

EXAMPLE				RATING	<u>s</u>			
	Very Bad 1	Bad 2	ad OK Good 2 3 4			ry Good 5	N/	/A
		1	2	3 4	5	6 7	8	9
Knowledge of Dismounted Drill								

(NCO numbers 2, 5, and 7 were rated "good" in the knowledge of dismounted drill, so the number "4" was placed in their boxes. Since you have never been able to evaluate NCO number 6 conduct dismounted drill, you rated him "N/A" and gave him a "6" in his box.)

	Very Bad Bad OK	Good 4	·	-	Good 5	·1	N//	١			
			1	7	.3	4	5	6	7	8	9
24.	knowledge of M113 crew drill.				L	i 		:			
			1_	2	3_	4	5	6	7	8	9
25.	Knowledge of squad dismounted patrolling techniques.				<u> </u>		<u> </u>		l 		
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
26.	Knowledge of how to prevent cold weather injuries.				1		<u>L</u>				
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
27.	knowledge of RTO (Radio-Telephone Operator) Procedures.	: <u>-</u>		 	· 		<u> </u>				
28.	knowledge of Defensive Tactics.	1	. 1	2	3	-1	5	6	7	8	<u>.</u>
		u	l	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
29.	knowledge of the tasks in the skill level 2/3 Soldier's Manual.										
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
30.	Knowledge of basic first aid.									l	(
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
31.	Knowledge of how to road march in the M113.										

Very Bad	Bad	ОК	Good	Very Good	N/A
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
- 32. Knowledge of how to change track on the M113.
- 33. Knowledge of wear and maintenance of chemical protective clothing.
- 34. Ability to navigate from an M113.
- 35. Ability to conduct PMCS (Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services) on the Mll3.
- 36. Ability to teach an interesting class.
- 37. Ability to operate an M16 rifle.
- 38. Ability to read a map.
- 39. Ability to use chemical detection devices.
- 40. Ability to fill out a DA Form 2404 on the M113.
- 41. Ability to effectively use training aids while teaching classes.
- 42. Ability to use a compass.

- 43. Ability to perform field expedient maintenance on the M113 in the field.
- 44. Ability to decontaminate himself and his equipment.
- 45. Ability to operate a DRAGON.
- 46. Ability to operate all squad radios and intercoms.
- 47. Ability to navigate dismounted.
- 48. Ability to operate an M60 machine gun.

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Very Bad	Bad	ок	Go	od	7	/ery	Good	i	N/	'A	
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				, 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	- {
ity to perfor	m pasic c	rew		ĺ	Į	į.	1	1.	1	l	i

- 49. Ability to perform basic crew level maintenance on the M113 in the motor pool.
- 50. Ability to set head space and timing on the .50 caliber machine gun.
- 51. His overall physical fitness is:
- 52. His overall attitude :Toward to:



ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

This portion of the survey asks you to answer questions about yourself and your unit. Circle only one answer per quest.

- 53. I have been in the Army:
 - 1. 5 years of less
 - 2. 6-8 years
 - 3. 9-10 years
 - 4.11-15 years
 - 5. More than 15 years
- 54. I have been in my current company:
 - 1. I month or less
 - 2. 2-4 months
 - 3. 5-6 months
 - 4. 7-12 months
 - 5. More than 12 months
- 55. I have been in my current platoon:
 - 1. 1 month or less
 - 2. 2-4 months
 - 3.5-6 months
 - 4. 7-12 months
 - 5. More than 12 months
- 56. The NCO professional development program in my company is:
 - 1. The worst I've ever seen
 - Marginal, at best
 - 3. About Average
 - 4. Better than most
 - 5. The best I've ever seen

57. With regard to my reenlistment intent:	7.	inte	ntions	:
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- I. I definitely plan to reenlist.
- 2. I will probably reenlist.
- 3. I am undecided about reenlisting.
- 4. I probably will not reenlist.
- 5. I definitely will not reenlist.

58. My current rank is:

- 1. SGT E5
- 2. SSG E6
- 3. SFC E7
- 4. MSC E8

59. I have been in my current grade:

- 1. 6 months or less
- 2. 7-12 months
- 3. 13-18 months
- 4. 19-24 months
- 5. More than 24 months

60. With regard to my marital status:

- I have never been married.
- 2. I am divorced (or going through a divorce).
- 3. I am married and my wife is living with me.
- 4. I am married and my wife will join me here as soon as quarters become available.
- 5. I am married but do not intend to bring my wife to ermany.

61.	My age is:
	1. 25 or less
	2. 26-7R
	3. 29-31
	4. 32-34
	5. 35 or older
62.	The overall combat effectiveness of my company is:
	1. Not effective
	2. Slightly effective
	3. Effective
	4. Very effective
	5. Extremely effective
63.	Compared to all other units I have ever served in, my current company is:
	1. A lot worse
	2. Slightly worse
	3. About the same
	4. Slightly better
	4. Alot better
64.	To make my company the most effective:
	1. Many improvements are needed

Quite a few improvement are needed

Very few improvements are needed

Few improvements are needed

No improvements are needed

Ple			ERFORMANCE
			evaluated/supported Cardinal Pointer evaluations not listed below.)
•	Month/year evaluated:	YEAR	MONTH
2.	Squad Evaluations		
		*RESULTS OF:	
	SQUAD	SQD MILES	M113 PROFICIENCY TEST
	1 SQD, 1 PLT	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	2 SQD, 1 PLT	7_7	<u> </u>
	3 SQD, 1 PLT	<u> </u>	<u>/ /</u>
	1 SQD, 2 PLT	<u>77</u>	77
	2 SQD, 2 PLT	<u>/ / </u>	<u>/ /</u>
	3 SQD, 2 PLT	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	1 SQD, 3 PLT	7_7	7_7
	2 SQD, 3 PLT	7_7	7_7
	3 SQD, 3 PLT	7_7	7_7
3.	Platoon Evaluations		
		*RESULTS OF:	
	PLATOON	PLT MILES	PLT DEFENSE/LIVE FIRE
	1st PLT		7_7
	2nd PLT		
	3rd PLT	7 7	7 7

*: In each box, place an S (Satisfactory), U (Unsatisfactory) or N (Not Tested).

BN
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INDIVIDUAL DATA

Please list below all individuals who work in rifle platoons in the company.

	PLT	SQD	SSN (LAST 4)	*POSITION	RACE	GT SCORE	#ART	15s	SQT SCORE	PT SCORE	RIFLE QOM SCORE
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^{*(}Position = Plt Sgt, Sqd Ldr, Fire Team Ldr, Sqd Member ONLY!)

REENLISTMENT

Please list below each individual first term reenlistment that has occurred during the period 1 Oct 81 - 28 Feb 82.

,					2 4		; ;	
	PLT (AT TIME OF RE-UP)	SQD (AT TIME OF RE-UP)	ELIGIBLE TO SELECT DIF	SELECTED SAME MOS?	ELIGIBLE FOR NON-PDA?	SELECTED PDA?	GT *	*HSDG PRIOR TO ENLISTING
LASI NAME	(h,1,2,3,0tm)	(6,2,1)	(Y=yes;N=no)	(Y=yes;N=no)	(Y=yes;N=no)	(Y=yes;N=no)		(Y=yes;N=no)
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*High School Diploma Graduate

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AGI R	ESULTS			
Please complete the following form for rating blocks, place an S (satisfactor or N (not evaluated), as appropriate.	r each compa ry), U (unsa	ny being su tisfactory)	rveyed. 1, C (comme	n the ndable)
Type Inspection: /// Announc				
Date of Inspection:	NTH Y	EAR		•
Maintenance: PMCS Validity	Score (%)	Ra	iting	
Training: Training Proficiency Test	(TPT) -	Score (%)	Re	iting
2 Mile Run:	_	Rating		,
Other: TA 50 Inspection	_	Rating		
Barracks Inspectio	on -	Rating		

Research Plan: Perceived Junior NCO Competencies and Deficiencies

Problem: There is a widely shared belief among field commanders and the senior Army leadership that the quality of a unit's squad and team leaders plays a key role in the unit's effectiveness. At the same time, it is felt that those junior NCO's are not being adequately trained and as a result, are deficient in many areas. This project is designed to identify the extent of junior NCO leadership deficiencies as perceived by their subordinates, supervisors, peers and the junior NCO's themselves.

Background: At the request of the DCSPER, LTC Richard Sklar, a student at the US Army War College (USAWC), agreed to design and carry out the present project with technical assistance from ARI personnel in the Leadership and Management Technical Area in the form of expert advise on research and statistical methodology. ARI has agreed to (1) advise LTC Sklar in the development of survey instruments to assess perceived junior NCO competencies, (2) monitor a pilot study of the project at Ft Stewart to refine the research methodology, (3) work with USAWC computer staff personnel to develop a statistical analysis plan and (4) perform the data analysis.

Specific Objectives:

To examine:

- a. The competency levels of junior NCOs (squad and team leaders) as perceived by subordinates, peers, supervisors and the junior NCOs, themselves.
 - b. Competencies that distinguish "superior" from "average" NCOs.
- c. Differences in perceived junior NCO competencies as a function of junior NCO demographic characteristics.
- d. Differences in perceived junior NCO competencies as a function of the rating group.
- e. Relationships between perceived junior NCO competencies, unit member performance and perceived unit effectiveness.

Sample: Subjects will be drawn from 108 squads in 12 companies of the 8th INF Division, USAREUR. They will include approximately 300 junior NCOs (squad/team leaders, E5-E6), 600 of their subordinates (squad members, E1-E4) and 30 supervisors (platoon SGTs, E7).

Method of Investigation:

Variable

Survey instruments will be administered to junior NCOs, their subordinates and their supervisors to obtain ratings of perceived competence of the junior NCO's. Four levels of ratings will be obtained using three questionnaires: subordinates ratings, self ratings, peer ratings and supervisor ratings. The self ratings and the peer ratings will be obtained from the same survey instrument. Each instrument will contain rater group specific demographic items as well as fifty-two items to assess junior NCO competency. These fifty-two items will be the same for each of the tour rater groups to allow for rating comparisons among these four levels.

Individual performance measures will be collected on each junior NCO and his/her subordinates in order to correlate perceived junior NCO competency with actual NCO and subordinate proficiency scores.

Table 1 provides a listing of the varibles that will be analyzed. The survey data (perceived NCO competence and demographic variables) will be analyzed separately for each of the four rating groups (subordinate, peer, supervisor and junior NCO self ratings). Perceived NCO competency will be operationalized in two ways within each rating group. One measure of perceived competency will be based on individual scores for each of the 52 items. A second measure, "perceived general competency", will be derived by combining the scores on the 52 individual competency items for an overall competency score within each rating group.

TABLE 1. List of Variables for Statistical Analysis

Item Number

		
Perceived N	CO Competency (Survey)*	
a. In	dividual Perceived Competency Items	1-52
b. Pe	rceived General Competency	1+2+3++52
(*These mea	r each group)	
Demographic	Variables	
a. Su	bordinate Survey	
1.	Duration in Army, CO, PLT, SQD, Grade 56,57,5	8,59,63
2.	Civilian Ed (HSG US. NonHSG) 60	
3.	Reenlistment Intention 61	

	4.	Current Rank (PVT E1-NCO)	:62	
	5.	Age	64	
ъ,	Pee	r/Self Survey		
	1.	Time in Army, CO, PLT, SQD, Grade	53,54,55,56,60	
	2.	Civilian Ed. (HSG vs NonHSG)	57	
	3.	Reenlistment Intention	58	
	4.	Current Rank (PVT E1-E6)	59	
	5.	Marital Status	61	
	6.	Age	62	
	7.	Military Education (Type of School)	66	
	8.	Superior Treatment	67	
	9.	NCO Placement Following Promotion	68	
	10.	Training Preparation	69	
	11.	Sr NCO Assistance	70	
	12.	Residence	71	
	13.	Training Aids Accessibility	72	
	14.	Training Schedule Turbulence	73	
	15.	BTMS Evaluation	74	
	16.	Training Time	75	
c.	Superior Survey			
	1.	Time in Army, CO, PLT, SQD	53-55	
	2.	NCO Professional Development	56	
	3.	Reenlistment Intention	57	
	4.	Current Rank (SP4 or below-E8)	58	
	5.	Time in Grade	59	

6. Marital Status

60

7. Age

61

Individual Performance Measures (aggregated to NCO)

- a. GT Scores
- b. Articles 15 Frequency
- c. SQT Scores
- d. PT Scores
- e. Rifle QOM Scores

Unit Performance Measures (Survey)

a.	Per	ceived Effectiveness	Item Numbers
	1.	Subordinate Survey (Squad Level)	53,53,55
	2.	Peer/Self Survey (Squad Level)	63,64,65
	3.	Superior Survey (Company Level)	63,64,65

Statistical Analyses

- 1. To examine the competency levels of junior NCOs (squad and team leaders) as perceived by subordinates, peers, supervisors and the junior NCOs themselves:
- A. The reliabilities of the subordinate, peer, supervisor and junior NCO perceived competency items will be assessed separately using the Cronbach alpha statistic as a measure of internal consistency.
- B. Means standard deviations and other descriptive statistics for each of the 52 perceived junior NCO competency items and demographic variables from the surveys will be computed for each rating group, separately.
- C. Responses to the 52 competency items will be combined separately for subordinate, peer, superior and junior NCO self-ratings to obtain a "general perceived competency" measure for each of the rating groups and descriptive statistics on these competency measures will be computed.
- 2. To identify perceived competencies distinguishing "superiors" from "everage" junior NCOs.
- A. The scores on the 52 perceived junior NCO competeny items will be analyzed separately for each of the four rating groups (subordinates, peers, superiors and junior NCO self-ratings).

- B. "Superior" and "average" junior NCOs will be defined by a mean split on the "general perceived competency" measure computed independently for each of the four rating groups and independent t-tests will be performed comparing the individual competency item means between the "superior" and "average" levels for each rating group separately.
- 3. To identify possible differences in perceived juniors NCO competency as a function of junior NCO demographic characteristics:
- A. Separate correlational analyses will be performed for each rating group between scores on the 52 individual competency items, the "general competency" measures derived by combining the individual item scores into one index for each rating group, and the following junior NCO demographic variables:
- 1) Duration in Army, CO, PLT, SQD and Grade (Items 53, 54, 55, and 60 respectively).
 - 2) Reenlistment Intention (Item 58)
 - Current Rank (Item 59)
 - 4) Age (Item 62)

- 5) Military Education (Item 66)
- 6) Respondiveness of Superiors (Item 67)
- 7) NCO Preparation (Item 69)
- 8) Training Schedule Turbulance (Item 73)
- 9) BN Training Management System Effectiveness (Item 74)
- 10) Training Time Availability (Item 79)
- B. To test for differences between perceived competency means (individual items and the "general competency" measure) for junior NCO demographic items 57 (Education); 61 (Marital Status) and 68 (NCO Placement), one way ANOVAS/t-tests will be performed.
- 4. To test for possible differences in perceived NCO competences as a function of the demographic characteristics of the rater, the survey data for each rating group will be analyzed separately as follows:

A. Subordinate data:

- 1) A correlational analysis between subordinate scores on the 52 individual perceived junior NCO competency items, the "general competency" measure based on the combination of these individual competency scores, and the following subordinate demographic variables:
- a) Duration in Army, CO, PLT, SQD and Grade (Items 56, 57, 58, 59, and 63, respectively).
 - b) Reenlistment Intention (Item 61)
 - c) Current Rank (Item 62)
 - d) Age
- 2) t-tests comparing the subordinates' perceived junior NCO competency means (individual competency and the "general competency" measure) as a function of subordinates' civilian education (Item 60).

B. Superior Data:


- 1) A correlational analysis between superior scores on the 52 individual perceived junior NCO competency items, the "general competency" measure based on combining these individual competency scores, and the following superior demographic variables:
- a) Duration in Army, CO, PLT, and Grade (Items 53,54,55, and 59 respectively).
 - b) NCO Professional Development (Item 56)
 - c) Reenlistment Intention (Item 57)
 - d) Current Rank (Item 58)
 - e) Age (Item 61)
- 2) One-way ANOVAS comparing the supervisors' perceived junior NCO competency means (individual competency items and the "general competency" measure as a function of marital status (Item 60).


C. Peer Data:

- 1. A correlational analysis between peer scores on the 52 individual perceived junior NCO competency items, their "general competency" measure based on a combination of those individual perceived competency scores, and the following peer demographic variables:
- 1. Duration in Army, CO, PLT, SQD and Grade (Items 53,54,55, and 60, respectively).

- 2. Reenlistment Intention (Item 58)
- Current Rank (Item 59)
- 4. Age (Item 62)

- 5. Military Education (Item 66)
- 6. Respondiveness of Superiors (Item 67)
- 7. NCO Preparation (Item 69)
- 8. Training Schedule Turbulance (Item 73)
- 9. BTN Training Management System Effectiveness (Item 74)
- 10. Training Time Availability (Item 75)
- 2. To test for differences between competency means as perceived by peers (individual items and their "general competency" measure) for peer demographic items 57 (education), 61 (Marital status) and 68 (NCO placement), one way ANOVAS/t-tests will be performed.
- 5. To examine relationships between perceived junior NCO competency and measures of individual and unit effectiveness, the following analyses will be performed for each rating group separately:
- A. Correlational analysis between the <u>competency measures</u> (individual competency items and the "general competency" measures) <u>and</u> scores on the <u>perceived unit effectiveness items</u> (Items 53,54,55 on the subordinate survey and items 63,64,65 on the peer/self and superior surveys).
- B. A correlational analysis between the <u>competency measures</u> and the <u>subordinate individual performance measures</u> (GT scores, Articles 15, SQT Scores, PT Scores, and Rifle QOM scores) aggregated to the NCO level.





LMPACT OF POOR JR NCO LOSP RETENTION OF QUALITY 1St TERMERS SMALL UNIT PROFICIENCY ST1 SQT SCORES Σ = FORCE READINESS UNIT COHESION

QUANTIFY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN


PERFORMANCE


NICO LEADERSHIP

SOT Assurs 84 INF DIVOND & ATSC DATA FROM: Issue #1

PERCEPTIONS of F 84 INF DW (M) AGI RESULTS TPT Besucts DATA FROM: Issue #2

CARDINAL POINT EVAL'S Recembus of | *AGI RESULTS 8th INF DW (M) DATA FROM: Issue #3 ARTEP RESULTS RATOON 1-Sour 1-TEAM





PERCEPTIONS OF HODA SURVEY UNIT COHESION
DRUGS COURTS MARTIAL
ALCOHOL ELMWATIONS
AWOL ARTS 15 SEMI- ANNUAL DATA FROM: $S_{\#}$ anss I

DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES

EFFECTIVE NCO LEADERSHIP

WHAT ARE TO PERCEPTIONS OF 8th Mech AGI DATA:

TECHNICAL COMPETENCE LEADERSHIP SKILL

SOLDIER/LT INTERVIEWS: TECHNICAL COMPETENCE

TACTICS SOLDERS'MANUAL

MAINTENANCE CREW DRILL

ABILITY TO TRAIN/TEACH USE OF THE TRAINING DAY

LEADERSHIP SKILLS:

SUPPORT FOR CHAIN OF COMMAND
CONCERN FOR SUBORDINATES
LOYALTY TO SUBORDINATES, SUPERIORS, UNIT
SET EXAMPLE IN APPEARANCE, MORALITY,
HONESTY, DEDICATION TO UNIT / MISSION
BEHAVIOR TOWARD DRIES, ALCOHOL, RACE

DETERMINE WHY
EFFECTIVE NCO LEADERSHIP IS
DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE

INTERVIEWS WITH ANCOC STUDENTS:

THE ARMY SAYS YOU REPRESENT A LEADERSHIP CRISIS;

• WHAT PREVENTS YOU FROM BEING AN EFFECTIVE LEADER ?

· WHAT ARE YOUR PROBLEMS?

· HOW IMPORTANT IS TECHNICAL COMPETENCE?

· HOW IMPORTANT IS LEADERSHIP SKILL?

Leadership Sub-Issues	Res	RESPONSIBILITY	ンアン
	TRADOC LINIT HODA	UNIT	HODA
POOR LT-NCO INTERFACE	>	>	
FAILURE TO REASSIGN NEW SGT'S		>	
NOT TRANSING THOSE ON E5 LIST		>	
LACK OF NCO PROFESSIONAL DEV.	>	>	
SOLDIERS' TIME WASTED		>	
SOD LARS NOT HELD ACCOUNTABLE		>	>
SAD LORS WITHOUT INFLUENCE		>	>
LACK OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE	>	>	>
ES "NO BIG THING"		>	>

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DETERMINE SOLUTIONS

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ANCOC	le NCU i	PROF DEV NJ UNITS		
UDENTS U	LEMS OF.	SCHOOLS IN UNITS NO TO REGS F		
WIS WITH STUDENTS IN ANCOC AND USASMA:	LDERSHIP PROBLEMS OF JR NCO IDENTIFIED BY SOCIETIES, NCO FFICERS, WILLT SOLUTIONS DO YOU RECOMMEND?"	TRADOC DAY/CENT PROF DEV		
INTERVIEWS	GINEN LEADER AND OFFIC	PROBLEM		
IMI	3		1	1

METHODOLOGY SUMMARY

- 1. DEFINE IMPACT OF POOR JA NCO LEADERSHIP.
- 2. DETERMINE SOLDIER/OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD AND BAD JR. NCO S.
- 3 CONFERENT JE NCO'S ; ASK WHY PROBLEMS EXIST.
- BE DONE TO SOLVE THE JE MCO LEADERSHIP CRISIS. 4. DETERMINE FROM JR AND SR NCO WHAT SHOULD

ALTERNATIVE PROBLEMS

PROPOWENCY

THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD: JECHNICAL COMPETENCE-New, complex systems DECENTRAUZATION

STUDY OPTIONS

-COMPLETE STUDY: SUBSTITUTE INSIGHT FOR STATISTICS AS NECESSARY.

FULLY DEVELOP "STATEMENT OF NEW AND WORK DESIGN: · STRIP OUT AND FULLY DEVELOP ONE ISSUE.

· SET ASIDE FOR MSP: USAWC CLASS of 1983

· SUBMIT TO ASP FOR CIVILIAN CONTRACT

DATA COLLECTION

RECORDS:

VII CORPS 84 INF DIV

SSC

INTERVIEWS/SURVEYS: 24 ARM DIV 94 INF DIV

24" INF DIV 10FAMBL DIV